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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Crow appeals from the district court's dismissal, following an evidentiary hearing, 
of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The factual background and procedural history of Crow's criminal case, as 
related by Idaho Court of Appeals, are as follows: 
In July 2010, officers responded to a shooting involving Crow and 
his ex-girlfriend (victim). Crow and the victim dated for approximately six 
years and separated around one month prior to the shooting. Crow and 
the victim had a child together and, at the time, were sharing custody. On 
the day of the shooting, Crow had custody of the child (at Crow's mother's 
residence) and was to return the child to the victim around noon. The 
victim observed Crow pull into her driveway that day. However, instead of 
dropping off the child, Crow backed up and left. The victim indicated that 
normally she would have been alone, but that day her mother was at her 
residence. The victim later surmised Crow had seen her mother's car in 
the driveway and left. 
A short time thereafter, the victim drove to Crow's mother's 
residence to pick up the child. When the victim arrived, Crow desired to 
talk about their relationship and the victim agreed. While talking on the 
front porch, the victim realized Crow had been drinking and decided to 
leave. The victim attempted to open the front door to retrieve her child, 
but found the door was locked and so she knocked. Because Crow was 
acting aggressively, the victim dialed 911 on her cell phone but did not 
send the call initially. Crow then drew a handgun from his pants and 
stated to the victim, "If I can't have you, no one can." Crow also stated "I 
got this for you" in a threatening manner while pointing the gun at the 
victim. By this time, the front door had been unlocked by someone within 
the house. The victim fled into the house and dialed 911. Crow pursued 
her. Crow again pointed the gun into the victim's face and chest, and the 
victim pushed the gun away. Crow fired the gun, wounding the victim in 
the arm. 
The victim retreated into a bathroom and locked the door. The 
victim heard one or two additional shots. One of these shots went through 
the bathroom door, although missing the victim. Crow subsequently 
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gained entry into the bathroom. In desperation, the victim began hugging 
Crow, telling him that she would come back to him. Crow loosened his 
grip on the gun and the victim seized it and turned it over to Crow's sister. 
Police arrived shortly thereafter. 
The state charged Crow with attempted murder in the first degree, 
I.C. §§ 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003(a), 18-4004 and 18-306; domestic 
battery involving traumatic injury in the presence of children, I.C. §§ 18-
918(2)(a) and (b) and 18-918(4); use of a firearm in the commission of a 
crime, I.C. § 19-2520; and infliction of great bodily injury, I.C. § 19-25208. 
Crow agreed to plead guilty to attempted first degree murder and the state 
agreed to dismiss the remaining charge and the enhancements.[1l The 
district court imposed a unified term of fifteen years, with a minimum 
period of confinement of nine years. The district court also imposed a 
$5000 fine pursuant to I.C. § 19-5307. Crow subsequently filed an I.C.R. 
35 motion for reduction of sentence and the district court denied the 
motion. 
State v. Crow, Docket 40073, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 809, pp.1-2 (Idaho App., 
December 31, 2013). On appeal, Crow argued that the $5,000 fine was not legal, his 
sentence was excessive, and the district court erred by denying his Rule 35 motion for 
leniency. Id. On December 31, 2013, the Idaho Court of Appeals issued an 
unpublished decision affirming Crow's term of imprisonment and the denial of his Rule 
35 motion, but reducing the fine to $2,500. kL p.6. The Remittitur was filed on January 
29, 2014. (8/28/14 Tr., p.118, Ls.13-15.) 
1 On October 30, 2015, the state filed a Motion to Augment the Appellate Record and 
Statement in Support Thereof, seeking to augment the record on appeal with: (1) the 
state's Motion to Amend Prosecuting Attorney's Information and attached proposed 
Amended Prosecuting Attorney's Information, filed March 7, 2011; (2) the Amended 
Prosecuting Attorney's Information, filed April 5, 2011; and (3) the Minute Entry for the 
April 4, 2011 pre-trial conference and hearing on the State's Motion to Amend 
Information (etc.), filed April 7, 2011. On November 2, 2015, this Court entered an 
Order Granting Motion to Augment the Record. The augmented documents show that, 
almost one year prior to Crow's guilty plea, the state unilaterally dismissed the felony 
domestic battery in the presence of children charge because it would be "unduly 
confusing for the jury to distinguish." (11 /2/15 Order Granting Mot. to Aug. the Record; 
3/7/11 Motion to Amend Pros. Atty's. Information; 4/5/11 Amended Pros. Atty's 
Information; 4/7/11 Minute Entry.) 
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On April 5, 2013, Crow filed a petition and affidavit for post-conviction relief, and 
a supporting memorandum, presenting a variety of claims2 based on the following 
underlying allegations: 
(1) the crime he pied guilty to -- attempted first degree murder -- does 
not exist in Idaho; 
(2) he was charged with two crimes that are the "same offense"; 
(3) trial counsel advised him to waive his preliminary hearing because 
he was facing the death penalty and because the judge would be 
angry with him otherwise; 
(4) the state coerced him into pleading guilty by overcharging him with 
two penalty enhancements that could not both be charged; 
(5) the firearm enhancement violated his right against double jeopardy; 
(6) trial counsel failed to appeal his civil judgment and consult with him 
about filing such an appeal; 
(7) he was denied the right to testify at his Rule 35 hearing; and 
(8) trial counsel failed to inform him about a lesser included offense 
(R., pp.4-23; Supp. R., p.1;3 see 8/28/14 Tr., p.28, Ls.8-16 (Crow's testimony regarding 
overcharging claim).) 
After Crow was appointed counsel (Supp. R., p. 7) and the state filed an Answer 
(R., pp.28-30), the district court stayed Crow's post-conviction proceeding to await the 
completion of his direct appeal (Supp. R., pp.12-13). Upon completion of Crow's direct 
appeal, the district court lifted the stay. (Supp. R., pp.20-21.) The district court held an 
2 In addition to Crow's basic post-conviction claims, he asserted many related claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and/or that his guilty plea was not knowingly and 
intelligently entered. 
3 Inasmuch as the record on appeal includes two different "Clerk's Supplemental 
Record on Appeal," the state will refer to the 55-page record as "R." and the 36-page 
record as "Supp. R." 
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evidentiary hearing on Crow's post-conviction claims on August 28, 2014 (see generally 
8/28/14 Tr.), and heard testimony by Crow and John Souza, who was Crow's third trial 
attorney and was also the attorney who had represented Crow at the time he entered 
his guilty plea (8/28/14 Tr., p.80, L.24-p.81, L.1).4 At the conclusion of the evidentiary 
hearing the district court rendered a verbal decision denying all of Crow's claims. 
(8/28/14 Tr., p.114, L.24 - p.141, L.15.) The district court entered a Judgment denying 
Crow post-conviction relief on September 9, 2014. (R., pp.38-39.) Crow filed a timely 
notice of appeal. (R., pp.40-43.) 
4 In sequence, Crow was represented in his criminal case by (1) Cindy Campbell (from 
initial charging through the preliminary hearing); (2) Kelly Mallard (from October 2010 to 
January 2011); (3) John Souza (from January 2011 to January 2012); (4) Manuel 
Murdoch - as stand-in counsel for a couple of months after Souza temporarily quit over 
money issues; (5) John Souza (from March 2012 (including plea agreement and change 
of plea hearing) through sentencing). (8/28/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.11-13; p.15, Ls.11-25; p.17, 
Ls.9-16; p.20, L.3 - p.21, L.15; p.29, Ls.5-1 O; p.78, Ls.6-7; p.81, Ls.1-4; p.85, Ls.1-3.) 
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ISSUES 
Due to the length of Issues set forth in Crow's Appellant's Brief, they are not 
reproduced here. (See Appellant's Brief, p.lV.) 
The state phrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Crow failed to show error in the district court's denial of his petition for post-
conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
Crow Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief Following An Evidentiary Hearing 
A Introduction 
Crow's post-conviction petition, supporting affidavit, and memorandum of law and 
facts present stand-alone claims, claims that his guilty plea was not knowing and 
voluntary, and claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. (See 
generally R., pp.4-23.) Regardless of how framed, Crow's claims center on allegations 
that (1) he pleaded guilty to an offense that does not exist in Idaho - attempted first 
degree murder; (2) Ms. Campbell, his initial trial counsel, told him he was facing the 
death penalty and the judge would get angry with him if he did not waive his right to a 
preliminary hearing; (3) the state coerced his guilty plea by improperly charging him with 
(a) two substantive offenses based on the same conduct, (b) two penalty enhancements 
for one offense, and (c) a firearm enhancement in connection with the attempted first 
degree murder charge; and (4) his attorney (a) failed to consult with him about, and 
appeal from, the civil judgment, (b) failed to inform him of the lesser included offense of 
injuring another by discharge of aimed firearms, I.C. § 18-3306, and (c) informed Crow 
he was not permitted to testify at the Rule 35 hearing. (R., pp.9-19.) 
At the evidentiary hearing, Crow testified in support of most, but not all, of his 
claims, and the state presented testimony by John Souza, the attorney who represented 
Crow at the time Crow accepted the plea agreement and pied guilty to attempted first 
degree murder. (See generally 8/28/14 Tr.) At the end of the hearing, the district court 
verbally rendered a decision denying Crow's request for post-conviction relief. (8/28/14 
Tr., p.118, L.22- p.141, L.15.) 
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On appeal, Crow restates the arguments he made to the district court in his 
Memorandum of Law and Facts in Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief. With a 
few modifications at the beginning and the conclusion, Crow's Appellant's Brief mirrors 
the body of the supporting memorandum he filed in district court. (Compare R., pp.12-
23 with Appellant's Brief, pp.3-13.) For the same reasons expressed by the district 
court in its verbal ruling at the end of the evidentiary hearing, and based on Crow's 
failure to present any evidence on several claims, Crow has failed to show error in the 
district court's denial of post-conviction relief. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil proceedings 
in which, like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her allegations by a 
preponderance of the evidence." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 
703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); 
I.C.R. 57(c)). 
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they 
are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district 
court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 
(1998). A trial court's decision that a post-conviction petitioner has not met his burden 
of proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 
965 (Ct. App. 1990). Appellate courts will "give due deference to any implicit findings of 
the trial court supported by substantial evidence." State v. Yeager, 139 Idaho 680, 684, 
85 P.3d 656, 660 (2004) (citing State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53, 961 P.2d 641, 
7 
643-44 (1998); State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625, 726 P.2d 735, 737 (1986)); State 
v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho 261, 268, 858 P.2d 800, 807 (Ct. App. 1993) ("Where explicit 
factual findings have not been made, we extrapolate the implicit findings of fact from the 
record and will uphold those if they are supported by substantial, competent evidence."); 
State v. Middleton, 114 Idaho 377, 380, 757 P.2d 240, 243 (Ct. App. 1988) (the 
appellate court should examine the record to determine the "implicit" findings which 
underlie the judge's order). 
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of 
the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 
2003). 
C. Standards Applicable To Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based upon ineffective 
assistance of counsel, he must demonstrate that his attorney's performance was 
objectively deficient and that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-61, 760 
P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988). To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must 
"overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance was adequate by 
demonstrating 'that counsel's representation did not meet objective standards of 
competence."' Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121, 124, 952 P.2d 1257, 1260 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(quoting Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 648-49, 873 P.2d 898, 902-03 (Ct. App. 
1994)). Appellate courts "will not second guess counsel without evidence of inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
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evaluation." State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 469-470, 816 P.2d 1023, 1026-27 (Ct. 
App. 1991) (citations omitted). 
When the alleged deficiency involves counsel's advice in relation to a guilty plea, 
"in order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 
and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) 
(footnote and citations omitted). "Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a 
petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have 
been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) 
(citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)). 
D. The District Court Correctly Concluded Crow Is Not Entitled To Post-Conviction 
Relief 
1. Claim That Attempted First Degree Murder Does Not Exist In Idaho 
Citing State v. Wood, 125 Idaho 911, 876 P.2d 1352 (1994), Crow argues on 
appeal, as he claimed and testified below, that he entered a guilty plea to a crime that 
does not exist in Idaho - attempted first degree murder. (Appellant's Brief, pp.3-4; see 
R., pp.5, 13-14; 8/28/14 Tr., p.24, Ls.13-17; p.56, L.4 - p.57, L.20.) From that 
underlying claim Crow argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing him to 
enter such a plea and that his plea was not knowingly and intelligently made. (Id.) 
Crow's arguments fail. 
In Wood, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that, although attempted felony 
murder is not a crime in Idaho, attempted first degree murder is: 
[Wood] contends that the conviction was improperly entered for the 
offense of attempted first-degree murder during the commission of a 
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felony.r5l We granted Wood's request to consider this additional issue on 
rehearing because we have recently held that attempted felony murder is 
not a crime in Idaho. State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 91, 873 P.2d 848 (1994). [5l 
. . . . Clearly the information was intended and understood by both 
the State and Wood to charge attempted premeditated murder (18-
4003(a)), and attempted murder committed during the commission of a 
felony (18-4003(d)). Wood thereafter negotiated with the State and 
entered a plea of guilty to the offenses charged in the information, 
attempted premeditated murder and attempted murder committed during 
the commission of a felony. 
. . . . Because we have held that there is no crime in Idaho for 
attempted first-degree murder committed during the commission of a 
felony, the plea entered by Wood to the charge is dismissed. However, 
this is of no avail to Wood on his petition for rehearing. He also clearly 
pied guilty to attempted premeditated and deliberate first-degree murder 
under I.C. § 18-4003(a) and was sentenced for that offense. The fact that 
one of the charges to which Wood pied guilty is dismissed has no effect 
on the validity of his plea to the other attempted first-degree murder 
charge. Therefore, the judgment of conviction and sentence for attempted 
premeditated murder are affirmed. 
Wood, 125 Idaho at 917, 876 P.2d at 1358 (emphasis added). 
Crow apparently believes that, because he was originally charged in a second 
count of the Information with felony domestic battery in the presence of children, he 
must have been charged in the first count with attempted first degree murder that 
5 Idaho's felony murder rule, I.C. § 18-4003(d), reads: 
Any murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to 
perpetrate, aggravated battery on a child under twelve (12) years of age, 
arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping or mayhem, or an act of 
terrorism, as defined in section 18-8102, Idaho Code, or the use of a 
weapon of mass destruction, biological weapon or chemical weapon, is 
murder of the first degree. 
6 In Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 558, 873 P.2d 800, 812 (1993), the Idaho Supreme Court 
concluded: 
We agree with Pratt. Attempted felony murder is not a crime in 
Idaho. Instead, there is either the crime of murder, or the crime of attempt 
to commit a crime .... 
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occurred "during the commission of a felony." kt (See 8/28/14 Tr., p.133, L.24 - p. 
134, L.11; p.136, L.20 - p.139, L.5.) As the district court informed Crow at the 
evidentiary hearing, the statement in Wood that "there is no crime in Idaho for attempted 
first-degree murder committed during the commission of a felony" refers to felony-
murder, and Crow was not charged with attempting that crime. (8/28/14 Tr., p.126, L.10 
- p.127, L.3; p.133, L.24 - p.140, L.24.) The district court further explained: 
That is talking about the Felony Murder Rule. Okay? You can 
commit a felony and if you commit a murder during that felony, that's what 
we call felony murder. You can still commit attempted murder, but it's not 
attempted felony murder. Okay? ... 
In this case, Wood was - he pied guilty to attempted first-degree 
murder in connection with a robbery. I don't know how to better explain it 
to you. They're talking about the Felony Murder Rule. It's an attempted 
murder rather than a felony murder. 
So attempted murder is a lawful crime in Idaho; attempted felony 
murder is not, because you actually have to commit a felony and kill 
somebody. You can't attempt to commit a felony and not kill anybody and 
be charged with attempted felony murder. 
(8/28/14 Tr., p.139, L.9 - p.140, L.6.) The district court correctly concluded that 
attempted first degree murder is a valid charge in Idaho, and Wood did not state 
anything different.7 Therefore, Crow's claim, and associated claims, that rely on the 
7 The district court correctly noted that the issue of whether attempted first degree 
murder is a crime in Idaho should have been raised on direct appeal, implicitly denying 
Crow's claim on that ground also. (8/28/14 Tr., p.122, Ls.10-14.) The UPCPA "is not a 
substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court, 
or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction." I.C. § 19-4901 (b). An "issue which 
could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be 
considered in post-conviction proceedings" except under very limited circumstances. 
I.C. § 19-4901(b); see Hoffman v. State, 125 Idaho 188, 190-91, 868 P.2d 516, 518-19 
(Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to consider issues that should have been raised on direct 
appeal). 
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assertion that attempted first degree murder is not a crime in Idaho are meritless. Crow 
has failed to show any error in the district court's denial of this claim, and the claims 
dependent upon it. 8 
2. Claim That Crow Was Charged With Duplicative Crimes 
Crow alleged in his post-conviction petition (via his supporting memorandum), as 
he does now on appeal, that the two substantive charges he faced were the same. He 
explains: 
Clearly, the Petitioner has been charged with the crimes of 
attempted first degree murder ... and he has also been charged with the 
crime of Domestic Battery, involving traumatic injury, (In [sic] the presence 
of a child) .... 
The charges against the Petitioner are the same charges, both 
arising out of the same criminal conduct. .... 
It is clear that one of the charges are [sic] inherent in the other 
charge, and would have been a lesser included offense of each other. 
Clearly, counsel was ineffective for not challenging the information as 
duplicative. 
This Court should find that the offenses as charged are inherent 
within each other. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6; R., pp.15-16.) Crow's claim was properly denied by the 
district court because he failed to present any evidence to support it at the evidentiary 
8 Moreover, the state filed an Amended Information over eleven months prior to Crow's 
guilty plea, eliminating the felony domestic battery in the presence of children charge 
because it would have confused a jury. (See 11/2/15 Order Granting Mot. to Augment 
the Record; 3/7/11 Motion to Amend Pros. Atty's. Information; 4/5/11 Amended Pros. 
Atty's Information; 4/7/11 Minute Entry.) Accepting, arguendo, Crow's argument that he 
was initially charged with attempted first degree murder "during the commission of a 
felony" based on his also being charged with committing felony domestic battery in the 
presence of children during the same incident, the only substantive offense he faced in 
the months before he pied guilty was attempted first degree murder. Therefore, Crow's 
argument fails even under his own logic. 
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hearing, it is irrelevant because the felony domestic battery charge was dismissed 
almost one year before he entered his guilty plea, and he waived the claim by pleading 
guilty to attempted first degree murder. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Crow's attorney did not argue, nor did Crow testify 
about, Crow's claim that his initial substantive charges - attempted first degree murder 
and felony domestic battery in the presence of children - were duplicative. (See 
generally 8/28/14 Tr.) Further, Crow did not attempt to have his verified post-conviction 
petition or supporting affidavit admitted into evidence at the evidentiary hearing. (See 
generally 8/28/14 Tr.; see also &, p.3 (list of exhibits admitted during evidentiary 
hearing).) Therefore, because Crow presented no evidence or testimony to support his 
claim, the district court correctly denied him relief. As recently explained by the Idaho 
Court of Appeals in Caldwell v. State, 2015 WL 4770639, *8-9 (Idaho App., Aug. 14, 
2015): 
A district court must "make specific findings of fact, and state 
expressly its conclusions of law," but it need only do so as "relating to 
each issue presented." I.C. § 19-4907(a) (emphasis added). The purpose 
of this requirement is to afford an appellate court an adequate basis upon 
which to review the district court's decision when a petition for post-
conviction relief has been denied following an evidentiary hearing. See 
Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 405, 775 P.2d 1243, 1247 (Ct. App. 1989); 
Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 497, 700 P.2d 115, 119 (Ct. App. 1985). 
However, as suggested by the language of I.C. § 19-4907(a), failing to 
present evidence in support of a properly raised post-conviction claim at 
an evidentiary hearing subjects that claim to dismissal. Loveland v. State, 
141 Idaho 933, 936, 120 P.3d 751, 754 (Ct. App. 2005). This remains true 
even if the petitioner previously submitted supporting affidavits, such as a 
verified petition for post-conviction relief. See id. (holding that the 
petitioner's verified petition did not constitute evidence unless it was 
introduced into evidence at the evidentiary hearing). 
In Loveland, based on the foregoing analysis, we concluded that 
the district court did not err in dismissing the petitioner's claim that his trial 
counsel had ignored his request to file an appeal because, at the 
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evidentiary hearing, the petitioner "declined to present any evidence" to 
support that claim. Id. Caldwell attempts to distinguish Loveland by 
asserting that the district court addressed the petitioner's claim that his 
trial counsel had failed to file an appeal, but found that he had presented 
no evidence in support thereof, whereas the district court here did not 
address either of Caldwell's claims at the evidentiary hearing or in its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
We conclude that this distinction does not reveal a substantive 
difference. The district court here did not address Caldwell's claim of 
failure to file an appeal, but this does not affect Caldwell's failure to raise 
these issues or present any evidence in support thereof at or after the 
evidentiary hearing. . . . Thus, even absent acknowledgement by the 
district court, Caldwell still failed to raise, much less meet his burden of 
presenting admissible evidence in support of, this claim. Accordingly, its 
dismissal along with the rest of Caldwell's post-conviction petition 
following the evidentiary hearing was proper. 
As in Caldwell and Loveland, because Crow failed to present any admissible 
evidence at the evidentiary hearing, he failed to show error in the district court's denial 
of his duplicative charges claim, even if the court did not address that claim. See id. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Crow presented some evidence supporting his 
duplicative charges claim at the evidentiary hearing, and that the district court implicitly 
considered and rejected it,9 Crow has failed to show any error in the court's denial of 
9 At one point in rendering its verbal opinion, the district court stated: 
You've raised that your guilty plea was unknowingly [sic] and 
coerced and overly charged and intimidated. 
As I've indicated, the charges were properly asserted, and as long 
as they're properly asserted, they can charge all of the crimes that they 
feel are appropriate. 
(8/28/14 Tr., p.128, L.23 - p.129, L.4.) Although the court did not refer to Crow's 
duplicative charges claim, by stating "the charges were properly asserted, and as long 
as they're properly asserted, they can charge all of the crimes that they feel are 
appropriate" (8/28/14 Tr., p.129, Ls.1-4), it implicitly determined that Crow's claim was 
meritless. See Yeager, 139 Idaho at 684, 85 P.3d at 660; Kirkwood, 111 Idaho at 625, 
726 P.2d at 737; Whiteley, 124 Idaho at 268, 858 P.2d at 807. 
14 
that claim. As noted, over eleven months before Crow entered his guilty plea, the state 
unilaterally dismissed the charge of felony domestic battery in the presence of children 
because it would be "unduly confusing for the jury to distinguish." (11/2/15 Order 
Granting Mot. to Aug. the Record; 3/7/11 Motion to Amend Pros. Atty's. Information; 
4/5/11 Amended Pros. Atty's Information; 4/7/11 Minute Entry.) The court clearly 
recognized that Crow's plea agreement was unrelated to the previously dismissed 
domestic battery charge. (See 8/28/14 Tr., p.117, Ls.7-13; p.127, L.25 - p.128, L.1; 
p.131, Ls.2-14.) Therefore, this Court should "extrapolate the implicit findings of fact 
from the record" and uphold the district court's denial of Crow's duplicative charges 
claim because his guilty plea could not have been affected by a charge the state 
dismissed almost one year earlier. See Whiteley, 124 Idaho at 268, 858 P.2d at 807; 
Middleton, 114 Idaho at 380, 757 P.2d at 243. 
Lastly, the district court correctly explained that, by entering a guilty plea, Crow 
waived all non-jurisdictional defects in prior proceedings, unless he preserved an issue 
for appeal by entering a conditional guilty plea. (8/28/14 Tr., p.120, L.20 - p.121, L.1 O.); 
see State v. Dunlap, 123 Idaho 396, 399, 848 P.2d 454, 457 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. 
Fowler, 105 Idaho 642, 643, 671 P. 2d 1105, 1106 (Ct. App. 1983). Because Crow pied 
guilty to attempted first degree murder without reserving his right to appeal his initial 
charges as duplicative, he waived that alleged non-jurisdictional defect. 
Inasmuch as Crow's claim was unsupported by any evidence, irrelevant, and 
waived, this Court should affirm the district court's implicit denial of the claim. 
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(3) Claim That Trial Counsel Advised Crow To Waive His Preliminary Hearing 
Because He Was Facing The Death Penalty 
Crow claimed, and testified at the evidentiary hearing, that his first attorney, Ms. 
Campbell, told him he was facing the death penalty, and that her comment was the 
main reason he agreed to waive his preliminary hearing. (R., pp.9, 14-15; 8/28/14 Tr., 
p.11, L.11 - p.13, L.14.) The district court assumed Crow was advised by counsel as 
alleged, but denied his claim, stating: 
This is a little bit different, though, however, because once he 
waived the preliminary hearing, he discussed those issues with other 
counsel, who substituted in place of Ms. Campbell. They took no action, 
but there's no evidence, specifically, in relation to Mr. Souza, that he was 
ever requested to have a new hearing. They discussed it but primarily 
focused on the issue of the plea agreement and moving forward. 
As has been discussed here today, when this Court discussed the 
issue raised in the Guilty Plea Questionnaire on Question 15 about that 
very issue, this Court felt that had been remedied by the plea agreement. 
The entry of a valid plea constitutes a waiver of non-jurisdictional 
defects in prior proceedings unless the same are preserved for appellate 
review .... 
By pleading guilty pursuant to the plea agreement, Mr. Crow, as 
explained to him at the time of his change of plea and through the Guilty 
Plea Advisory Form, waived that non-jurisdictional defect, and therefore, 
the issue should have also been raised on appeal. 
This is where post-conviction gets a little sticky, because several 
issues could be raised on appeal yet still have some impact on an 
attorney's effective representation. 
As it applies to the preliminary hearing, the burden, then, is that Ms. 
Campbell's recommendation had to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, and the result would have had to have been different -
the outcome of the case. 
And this Court does not think the defendant has carried that 
burden. And that's because of two things. 
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Even though that - assuming that that was told to Mr. Crow, he was 
at least told at the initial appearance and at his arraignment and at the 
change of plea what the maximum possible penalties were. At no time 
was the death penalty ever raised. And so for that basis, the petition for 
the failure to raise - or waive the preliminary hearing because of that 
representation of Ms. Campbell is denied. 
(8/28/14 Tr., p.120, L.11-p.122, L.5.) 
In sum, the district court denied Crow's claim that he waived his right to a 
preliminary hearing because his attorney told him he was facing the death penalty for 
the following reasons: (1) Crow signed a waiver form indicating he was not coerced into 
waiving his right to a preliminary hearing (see Respondent's Exhibit C); (2) Crow 
discussed the issue with Mr. Souza, his attorney at the time the plea agreement was 
reached and Crow entered his guilty plea, but Crow did not request a new preliminary 
hearing (see 8/28/14 Tr., p.67, L.1 - p.85, L.14); (3) by pleading guilty, Crow waived all 
non-jurisdictional defects (see Respondent's Exhibit B); see also Dunlap, 123 Idaho at 
399, 848 P.2d at 457; Fowler, 105 Idaho at 643, 671 P. 2d at 1106); (4) Crow was 
advised of the maximum penalties at his initial appearance, arraignment, and the 
change of plea hearing, 10 and "[a]t no time was the death penalty ever raised" (8/28/14 
Tr., p.121, L.23- p.122, L.2). 
The district court's reasons for denying Crow's claim - especially that his 
eventual guilty plea to attempted first degree murder waived all prior non-jurisdictional 
defects - are supported by the facts and law. Insofar as Crow's claim asserted his 
preliminary hearing counsel was ineffective for telling him he was facing the death 
penalty (see R., pp.6, 9, 14-15), he was required to prove there was a reasonable 
10 The state recognizes that Crow's initial appearance is the only one of the three 
proceedings that occurred before Crow's preliminary hearing date. 
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probability of a different outcome if he had not been told by counsel that he was facing 
the death penalty. 11 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688; Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 
758,761,760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988). Crow has not explained why, and certainly did 
not present any evidence to demonstrate that, absent counsel's (presumed) deficient 
performance, he not only would have opted to have a preliminary hearing, but would 
have successfully also challenged a "probable cause" finding at such hearing. In light of 
the fact that Crow subsequently pied guilty to attempted first degree murder under the 
much higher "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof, Crow's unsupported claim 
that he would have prevailed at a preliminary hearing rings hollow. 
Crow has failed to show any error in the district court's denial of this claim. 
(4) Claim That The State Coerced Crow Into Pleading Guilty By Overcharging 
Him With Two Penalty Enhancements 
In his post-conviction petition, Crow claimed -- very generally -- that his guilty 
plea "was coerced by being overly charged and intimidated" (R., p.5), but he did not 
explain how he was "overly charged and intimidated." In his supporting affidavit, Crow 
repeated his vaguely-worded claim, stating, "I believe that I have been overly charged 
and that because of this, I became scared and entered into a plea to a charge that does 
not even exist in the State of Idaho." (R., pp.9-10.) In his supporting memorandum, 
Crow expounded on his claim a bit further, stating, "the use of a weapon as was 
charged herein, was charged in the information as the ways or the means to have 
committed the charged [sic], and to have imposed an extended term for the use of a 
11 Moreover, Crow has failed to explain why his (alleged) belief that he was facing the 
death penalty caused him to waive his right to a preliminary hearing. It seems much 
more likely that a person facing such severe penalty would contest the state at every 
turn, if only to preview the state's evidence and witnesses. 
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weapon, when the same weapon was charged as the ways or the means to have 
committed the offense, violates double jeopardy." (R., pp.16-17.) Accordingly, Crow's 
claim that he was overly charged and intimidated was based upon his assertion that the 
firearm enhancement, in combination with the charge of attempted first degree murder, 
violated principles of double jeopardy. 
!However, at the evidentiary hearing, Crow did not present any testimony, 
evidence, or argument to support his claim that the filing of the firearm enhancement 
placed him in double jeopardy, and (presumably) for that reason, the court did not rule 
on that particular claim, implicitly denying it for lack of proof.12 (See generally 8/28/14 
12 When he testified, Crow asked to read two statements he had prepared. (8/28/14 
Tr., p.30, L.23 - p.31, L.12.) The court said the statements were appropriate for closing 
argument and did not allow Crow to read them during the evidentiary phase of the 
hearing. (8/28/14 Tr., p.32, Ls.9-22.) During closing argument, the court admitted both 
documents into evidence as argument. (8/28/14 Tr., p.98, L.22 - p.100, L.19.) Crow's 
counsel acknowledged the first document (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) was information from Mr. 
Crow, and the second document (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) was "what [Crow] wanted to read 
from the witness stand, but it does contain more legal argument than facts." (8/28/14 
Tr., p., 99, L.3 - p.100, L.7.) Crow's exhibits presented two new arguments: (1) the 
firearm enhancement could not be applied to an attempt crime, and (2) the state 
improperly charged him with two enhancements for one felony. (See generally, 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2); see also I.C. §§ 19-2520, 19-25208, 19-2520E. 
Treating Crow's new arguments like claims, the court correctly denied them, 
concluding the firearm enhancement applies to attempt crimes, and (2) the state was 
entitled to file two enhancements against Crow in relation to the charge of attempted 
first degree murder -- as long as Crow was not sentenced for two or more 
enhancements. (8/28/14 Tr., p.122, L.16 - p.126, L.9; p.127, L.4 - p.128, L.18.) 
On appeal, Crow repeats the arguments made in his Memorandum of Law and 
Facts in Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief -- he does not challenge the 
court's decisions in regard to the arguments presented in the exhibits admitted during 
closing argument at the evidentiary hearing. (See generally Appellant's Brief.) In any 
event, the court's reasons for denying Crow's two closing arguments are correct. (See 
8/28/14 Tr., p.122, L.16 - p.126, L.9; p.127, L.4 - p.128, L.18.) 
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Tr.; Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2); Yeager, 139 Idaho at 684, 85 P.3d at 660; Whiteley, 124 
Idaho at 268, 858 P.2d at 807. 
Inasmuch as Crow failed to support his double jeopardy claim (re: the firearm 
enhancement) with any evidence or argument at the evidentiary hearing, he has failed 
to show any error in the district court's implicit denial of that claim. See Loveland, 141 
Idaho at 936, 120 P.3d at 754; Caldwell, 2015 WL 4770639 at *8-9. 
(5) Claim That Trial Counsel Failed To Appeal His Civil Judgment And 
Consult With Him About Filing Such An Appeal 
In his post-conviction petition, Crow claimed that his attorney provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to "file an appeal from the Civil [sic] judgment entered in this case. 
(Which violates Double Jeopardy)." (R., p.6.) At the end of the evidentiary hearing, the 
district court denied Crow's claim, explaining: 
You raised the issue that you did not file an appeal from the civil 
judgment in this case, which violates double jeopardy. That issue is moot 
because there was an appeal. 
This Court acknowledges that it misapplied 19-5307 when it 
imposed that additional civil penalty. And, quite frankly, if I had been 
advised of that earlier, I could have saved that issue for appeal because it 
was not proper. I acknowledge that mistake, but that's been cured on 
appeal. 
(8/28/14 Tr., p.129, Ls.15-24.) 
Despite the district court's explanation, on appeal, Crow maintains his argument 
that "Counsel for the Petitioner did not file an appeal from the Civil Judgment entered 
against the Petitioner in this matter, under case number CR-2010-5971 [,]" and that 
"Counsel for the Petitioner did not ever confer with him to ascertain as to whether or not 
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the Petitioner wanted to file an appeal of the Civil judgment entered in this case." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) 
Crow's argument is completely belied by the record, which shows that he not 
only filed a direct appeal, but in that appeal, he successfully challenged the legality of 
the $5,000 fine that was imposed, getting it reduced to $2,500. See Crow, Docket 
40073, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 809, p.6. Because Crow's claim is based on a 
completely inaccurate factual basis, he has shown no error in the district court's denial 
of his claim. 
(6) Other Issues Waived By Crow's Failure To Support Them With Evidence 
Crow contends on appeal, as he did in his memorandum supporting his post-
conviction petition in district court, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 
by (1) advising him that he could not testify or give evidence at the hearing on his Rule 
35 motion for leniency (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-1 O; see R., p.6); (2) failing to inform him 
of the lesser included and "commanding" statute of I.C. § 18-3306, injuring another by 
discharge of aimed firearms (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-13; see R., pp.20-23); 13 and (3) 
advising him that he "needed to waive [his] preliminary hearing, because if [he] did not 
do so, it would make the judge mad and he would rule against [him] during Trial [sic]" 
(Appellant's Brief, Exhibit B; see R., p.9). 
Although Crow presented the above-described "claims" to the district court (in his 
petition, supporting affidavit, and/or supporting memorandum) and repeats them on 
13 Crow also argues that the prosecutor violated his due process rights by failing to 
"follow the mandatory commands of 18-3306" by not charging him with that 
misdemeanor instead of attempted first degree murder. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-13.) 
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appeal, he failed to present any testimony or evidence to support them at the 
evidentiary hearing. 14 (See generally 8/28/14 Tr.) As a result, under Caldwell and 
Loveland, Crow has waived those claims and they should be dismissed. See Caldwell, 
2015 WL4770639 at *8-9; Loveland, 141 Idaho at 936, 120 P.3d at 754. 
The district court commented on the lack of merit in Crow's claim that his 
attorney advised him that he was not entitled to testify at the Rule 35 hearing, stating: 
This Court is not required to even allow argument. Arguments were 
made at the Rule 35 hearing. This Court does not take testimony, 
evidence set for a Rule 35. If there's any new evidence, it's presented 
through affidavit form. 
(8/28/14 Tr., p.130, Ls.1-5.) Indeed, I.C.R. 35(b) states that motions to correct or 
modify sentences "shall be considered and determined by the court without the 
admission of additional testimony and without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered 
by the court .... " Even if considered on appeal, Crow has failed to show any error in 
the district court's denial of this claim. 
Next, Crow's argument in regard to I.C. § 18-3306 is two-fold. First, he asserts 
the prosecutor was obligated to charge him with violating I.C. § 18-3306 (injuring 
another by discharge of aimed firearms) instead of attempted first degree murder, which 
Crow contends is a crime that does not exist in Idaho. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-13.) 
Crow's argument is based on the mistaken notion that attempted first degree murder is 
not a crime in Idaho. As previously discussed, see § D.1, supra, Crow misconstrues 
language in Wood that states there is no such crime as attempted felony-murder in 
14 In regard to Crow's claim that he was incorrectly advised by counsel about his right 
to testify at the Rule 35 hearing, the district court noted that Crow had "not argued here 
today or presented any evidence regarding your Rule 35 hearing." (8/28/14 Tr., p.129, 
L.25-p.130, L.1.) 
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Idaho. Wood, 125 Idaho at 917, 876 P.2d at 1358. Instead, Crow argues that the 
charge of attempted first degree murder cannot be brought if that offense occurred 
during the commission of one or more charged felonies. For the same reasons and 
analysis previously presented, see § D.1, supra, Crow's argument is fatally flawed by 
his misreading of Wood; therefore, the district court's implicit denial of this claim, even if 
considered on appeal, should be upheld. See Yeager, 139 Idaho at 684, 85 P.3d at 
660; Whiteley, 124 Idaho at 268, 858 P.2d at 807. 
In a related claim, Crow argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
inform him that the crime of injuring another by discharge of aimed firearms (I.C. § 18-
3306) is a lesser included offense to attempted first degree murder, and that his guilty 
plea was not entered "knowingly and voluntarily." (Appellant's Brief, p.11; see R., p.21.) 
However, Crow failed to allege, much less provide evidence showing that, under the 
prejudice prong of Strickland, "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
(alleged) errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. Further, Crow failed to allege and prove that "a decision to 
reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla, 559 
U.S. at 372 (citing Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470). Crow has failed to show error in the 
implicit denial of this claim. 
Finally, Crow argues that he waived his preliminary hearing, in part, because his 
trial counsel advised him that, if he did not do so, the judge would get angry and rule 
against him during trial. (See Appellant's Brief, p.13 (referring to "the attached sworn 
affidavit of the Petitioner, (Which was used in the Post Conviction case)").) As stated, 
because he presented no evidence or testimony on this claim during the evidentiary 
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hearing, Crow failed to support his claim with any facts that would warrant relief - i.e., a 
showing of deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland. See Caldwell, 2015 
WL 4770639 at *8-9; Loveland, 141 Idaho at 936, 120 P.3d at 754. Crow has failed to 
show any error in the district court's implicit denial of this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's judgment 
denying Crow's petition for post-conviction relief. 
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